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O P I N I O N  
   
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge:  
 Appellant Casey Dooley challenges the District Court’s 
sua sponte dismissal of his Complaint without leave to amend 
 3 
 
as well as the Court’s declaration that the dismissal constituted 
a “strike” for purposes of the Prison Litigation Reform Act 
(PLRA).  Because we agree that the District Court erred in both 
respects, we will vacate the District Court’s Order and remand 
for further proceedings. 
 
I. Background  
This case arises out of Dooley’s pro se challenge to the 
refusal of the Department of Corrections (DOC) to assign him 
the mental classification associated with the greatest mental 
health resources.  Specifically, Dooley argues that he should 
be listed as a D Stability Code inmate and receive the mental 
health resources that accompany that status.  The DOC 
Officials’ refusal to designate him D Stability Code, in 
Dooley’s view, violated his Eighth Amendment rights.  On 
appeal, Dooley contends that the District Court erred when it 
dismissed his Eighth Amendment claim and that the Court at 
least should have granted him leave to amend.  Dooley also 
argues that the Court erred when it determined that the 
dismissal of the suit constituted a “strike” under the PLRA.  We 
discuss each issue in turn. 
 
a. D Stability Code and Guilty but Mentally Ill 
Inmates 
 
The D Stability Code that Dooley seeks applies to 
inmates who have the most significant mental health needs and 
entitles them to the greatest amount of mental health resources 
available.  Pa. DOC Reg. § 13.8.1(1)(B)(2)(g)(1)(d).  DOC 
policy specifies that certain inmates should be listed on the “D 
Roster,” including those who have been found guilty but 
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mentally ill (GBMI).  Pa. DOC Reg. 
§ 13.8.1(2)(A)(1)(a)(4)(d), (J)(3)(a).   
 
When a jury renders a GBMI verdict in Pennsylvania, 
the court must hear testimony and make a finding as to whether 
the defendant is, at the time of sentencing, “severely mentally 
disabled,” requiring treatment under the Mental Health 
Procedures Act.  42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9727(a).  Some aspects 
of DOC policy differentiate between inmates found GBMI and 
determined to be severely mentally disabled (Category I) and 
those found GBMI but determined not to be severely mentally 
disabled (Category II).  See Pa. DOC Reg. § 13.8.1(2)(J)(1)(b).  
All GBMI inmates must be placed on the D Roster when they 
first arrive at the DOC and subsequently receive regular 
psychiatric evaluation.  Id. at § 13.8.1(2)(J)(3). 
 
b. Dooley’s GBMI Status and Grievances Seeking 
D Stability Code 
 
The parties’ conflict turns in part on a disagreement, 
reflected throughout the grievance process, about whether 
Dooley should be considered a GBMI inmate.  Although the 
outcome of that factual dispute does not dispose of the 
questions before us, the issue warrants some explanation for 
the sake of context.   
 
In 2002, Dooley was tried for five counts of attempted 
murder, five counts of aggravated assault, possession of an 
instrument of a crime, and reckless endangerment of another 
person, and the jury found him GBMI on all charges.  Dooley 
has cited the jury’s GBMI finding in grievances requesting the 
D Stability Code designation as well as his Complaint.  On 
August 13, 2017, Dooley filed a grievance complaining that he 
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was “not being treated as a D Code,” despite having been found 
guilty but mentally ill by the jury.  App. at 149.  He noted that 
he had previously written staff about the issue.  He submitted 
a second grievance on August 24, in which he claimed that an 
official told him in an annual review that, because the jury’s 
verdict had been changed, he was not GBMI and therefore was 
not a D Stability Code.  Dooley filed the grievance to object to 
this determination, contending the jury’s GBMI finding should 
have been credited.   
 
Although there is no dispute that the jury found Dooley 
GBMI, the DOC Officials repeatedly represented to Dooley 
that his court documents no longer identified him as GBMI, 
and that he therefore should not be labeled D Stability Code.  
It is unclear what the sentencing judge determined or what 
evaluations were performed, as that aspect of the record has not 
been provided to us.  The only portion of the sentencing 
transcript before us consists of three pages that Dooley 
attached to his Complaint, in which defense counsel briefly 
referenced the jury’s GBMI verdict, and the sentencing court 
noted that Dooley “needs some psychiatric assistance,” before 
going on to state Dooley’s sentence without any specific 
reference to mental health treatment.  App. at 62–63.  
Otherwise, all we know is what the various DOC officials have 
represented as noted below.   
 
On August 29, DOC Official Richard Goss denied the 
first grievance.  Goss wrote:  
 
I have reviewed your claims in this grievance and 
we have discussed this at length previously.  I 
have also spent considerable time researching 
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this for you.  You are not GBMI nor a D stability 
Code.  
 
You were found Guilty But Mentally Ill by the 
jury.  At that time, the judge entered a temporary 
sentencing order pending a Psychiatric 
evaluation to address the GBMI.  The result of 
the evaluation did not support the GBMI 
designation and it was deleted from the final 
order.  
 
This grievance has no merit and is denied.  
App. at 151.  On appeal, DOC Official Kevin Kauffman upheld 
this decision.  He reiterated that, although a jury found Dooley 
GBMI, the “judge entered a temporary sentencing order 
pending a psychiatric evaluation to address the GBMI verdict.  
The evaluation did not support the GBMI designation and it 
was deleted from the final order.”  App. at 152.  He then 
concluded, “you are not a stability D inmate” and 
recommended that Dooley address any concerns to the 
sentencing judge.  App. at 152.   
Dooley appealed to the Chief Grievance Officer, Dorina 
Varner, who upheld the previous decisions.  Her response 
followed the recommendation of the Acting Director of the 
Psychology Office, who noted that “Inmate Dooley’s court 
documents were reviewed and found to not identify him as 
‘Guilty but Mentally Ill.’”  App. at 141.  Chief Grievance 
Officer Varner’s decision read:  
 
It has been found that your court documents were 
reviewed and found to not identify you as 
 7 
 
“Guilty but Mentally Ill”.  Because you do not 
like or agree with the interpretation of your court 
documents does not give any further merit to 
your claims.  If you do not agree with the court 
documents, this should be addressed with the 
Judge and the court.  Therefore, this office 
upholds the responses provided to you and your 
requested relief is denied. 
App. at 140.  The denials of Dooley’s grievance and appeals 
seeking D Stability Code classification were thus consistently 
premised on his purported lack of GBMI status.  
 
 The District Court seems to have credited the DOC 
Officials’ assertion that the GBMI designation was “deleted.”  
App. at 5.  Dooley, however, maintains that his GBMI status 
continued to apply and supported his claim that he was entitled 
to the more intensive mental health treatment offered to D 
Stability Code inmates.  On appeal, the DOC Officials do not 
argue that the sentencing court removed the GBMI finding 
altogether; they merely assert that the court found Dooley was 
not severely mentally disabled under 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 
9727(a).   
Given the foregoing facts, Dooley’s contention that he 
retained the GBMI designation, at least to some extent, is not 
baseless.  If, as the DOC Officials contend, a jury found Dooley 
GBMI and a sentencing judge concluded that Dooley was not 
severely mentally disabled, that would not have eliminated his 
GBMI status.  Under current DOC policy, it would have placed 
him in Category II of GBMI inmates, which would have 
required that he be placed on the D Roster and that he 
subsequently receive regular psychiatric evaluation.  See Pa. 
DOC Reg. § 13.8.1(2)(J)(1)(b)(2), (3).  Although the current 
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DOC policies may not have been in effect at the time of 
Dooley’s initial incarceration, they support the view that, even 
if the sentencing judge found him not severely mentally 
disabled, his GBMI verdict did not disappear or lose all 
significance.1 
c. Complaint 
In May 2018, Dooley filed a pro se complaint in the 
Court of Common Pleas for Huntingdon County against Goss, 
Kauffman, and John Wetzel, the Secretary of DOC.  The 
Complaint alleged, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, that the DOC 
Officials violated Dooley’s Eighth Amendment rights through 
deliberate indifference to his serious mental health needs.  The 
Complaint cited the GBMI verdict as a primary reason why 
Dooley should be categorized as D Stability Code and entitled 
 
1 The record does not indicate specifically what policies for 
mental health classification were in place at the time of 
Dooley’s incarceration in 2002.  As Dooley points out, 
however, the Pennsylvania DOC adopted the current mental 
health classification system, which includes the D Stability 
Code, in 2015 in response to a Department of Justice 
investigation into the DOC’s mistreatment of mentally ill 
inmates, including problems with classification.  See Letter 
from David Hickton, U.S. Attorney, W.D. Pa. to Tom Corbett, 
Governor of Pa. (May 31, 2013) (announcing statewide 
expansion of investigation), available at 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2013/06/
03/cresson_findings_5-31-13.pdf; Letter from David Hickton, 
U.S. Attorney, W.D. Pa. to Tom Corbett, Governor of Pa. (Apr. 
14, 2016) (announcing decision to close investigation in light 
of improvements by DOC), available at 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/841061/download.  
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to the resources associated with that status.  Dooley also 
attached to the Complaint pages from the sentencing hearing 
transcript, which included a remark by the judge about 
Dooley’s need for psychiatric assistance.  The Complaint 
stated that Dooley “has suffered agonizing mental health pain 
and trauma and serious depression, lack of sleep, being 
paranoid throughout the day, nightmares, and physical abuse 
because of his mental illness.”  App. at 49.  It noted that Dooley 
“suffers from acute/serious depression sometimes bordering on 
manic-depression” requiring treatment.  App. at 50.   
 
Dooley claimed that, despite his mental health 
problems, the DOC Officials refused to provide him adequate 
mental health treatment, specifically the treatment afforded to 
D Stability Code inmates.  This allegedly caused him to 
“suffer[ ] severe harm.”  App. at 48.  He noted that, as the basis 
for refusing to provide him D Code treatment, the officials 
simply asserted that he was not found GBMI because the 
sentencing judge changed the verdict.  By denying him 
adequate mental health treatment, the Complaint contended, 
the DOC officials were deliberately indifferent to Dooley’s 
serious medical needs in violation of his Eighth Amendment 
rights.   
d. Federal Court Proceedings 
Shortly after Dooley filed his Complaint, the DOC 
Officials removed the action to federal court, and the case 
was referred to Magistrate Judge Joseph F. Saporito, Jr.  The 
DOC Officials quickly filed a Motion to Dismiss or for 
Summary Judgment.  They argued only that Dooley had 
failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.   
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In his Report and Recommendation (R&R), the 
Magistrate Judge concluded that Dooley did exhaust his 
administrative remedies but recommended the District Court 
dismiss the Complaint as frivolous and for failure to state a 
claim.  He concluded that Dooley had alleged no personal 
involvement by any of the defendants, finding the review 
and/or denial of a grievance insufficient to show personal 
involvement.  The R&R recommended that the District Court 
sua sponte dismiss the Complaint and that it do so without 
leave to amend because amendment would be futile.  The R&R 
also included a “Three Strikes Warning.”  App. at 36–37.  That 
warning stated that adoption of the recommendation to dismiss 
the suit would result in a strike under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) and 
that accumulation of three strikes would preclude Dooley from 
proceeding in forma pauperis in subsequent cases.   
 
 Both parties objected to the R&R, but the District Court 
overruled the objections.  The Court first considered and 
overruled Dooley’s objections.  It found that Dooley failed to 
state an Eighth Amendment violation because he did not 
sufficiently allege that he had been deprived of “life’s 
necessities,” such as “food, clothing, shelter, medical care and 
reasonable safety.”  App. at 9–10 (citations omitted).  The 
Court further concluded that the Complaint was insufficiently 
detailed and did not particularly allege the DOC Officials’ 
personal involvement.  It then declined to consider the 
officials’ objections as to exhaustion, as they were rendered 
moot because of the dismissal of the Complaint on the merits.  
The Court adopted the R&R’s recommendation to deny the 
Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment but to sua sponte 
dismiss the Complaint without leave to amend as frivolous and 
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for failure to state a claim.2  The Court did not address whether 
leave to amend would be inequitable or futile.  The Order 
included a statement that the dismissal as frivolous and for 
failure to state a claim constituted a “strike” under 28 U.S.C. § 
1915(g).  
 
II. Discussion  
Dooley raises multiple challenges to the District Court’s 
rulings.  First, Dooley contends that the District Court erred 
when it dismissed his Eighth Amendment claim and that, at a 
minimum, the Court should have granted leave to amend the 
Complaint.  Next, Dooley argues that the Court lacked the 
authority to determine whether the dismissal of the suit 
constituted a “strike” under the PLRA and that, even if it had 
such authority, the Court erroneously labeled his suit a “strike.”  
We address each challenge in turn.3   
 
2 The District Court predominantly applied the standard for 
evaluating whether a pleading has stated a claim, but rather 
than simply concluding that Dooley’s Complaint failed to state 
a claim, the Court further declared that the Complaint was 
“frivolous under the law.”  App. at 10.  The Court’s Order 
purported to dismiss the Complaint “as frivolous,” but another 
part of the Order referred to “the dismissal of this action as 
frivolous and for failure to state a claim.”  App. at 3.  The 
Memorandum cited the statutory provisions for both grounds.  
We therefore assume that the District Court dismissed the 
Complaint both as frivolous and for failure to state a claim.  
3 The District Court had jurisdiction over Dooley’s claim 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1441.  We have jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 over the Court’s final decision 
dismissing the Complaint. 
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a. Dismissal of Dooley’s Eighth Amendment 
Claim 
We first address the District Court’s decision to dismiss 
Dooley’s Complaint as frivolous and for failure to state a claim 
under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A, 1915(e)(2) and 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1997e(c).  Although we agree that Dooley failed to 
adequately state a claim against these specific individuals 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, we do not find the Complaint so 
baseless as to be frivolous.  Further, the District Court made no 
finding as to whether amendment would be inequitable or 
futile, and thus erred in dismissing the Complaint without leave 
to amend. 
 
We exercise plenary review over the District Court’s 
sua sponte dismissal of the Complaint under 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 1915A, 1915(e)(2), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c).  It is well 
settled that we consider dismissals for failure to state a claim 
de novo.  Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000); 
see also Castleberry v. STI Grp., 863 F.3d 259, 262–63 (3d Cir. 
2017).  We apply the same standard to the Complaint’s 
dismissal as frivolous.  Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 530 (3d 
Cir. 2003).  In assessing the Complaint, we are mindful of our 
“obligation to liberally construe a pro se litigant’s pleadings,” 
Higgs v. Att’y Gen., 655 F.3d 333, 339 (3d Cir. 2011), 
particularly where the pro se litigant is imprisoned.  Mala v. 
Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 244–45 (3d Cir. 2013).   
 
Dooley’s Complaint failed to state an adequate § 1983 
claim because it did not demonstrate personal involvement by 
any of the defendants in the complained-of conduct.  In 
advancing any § 1983 claim against prison officials, a plaintiff 
may not rely solely on a respondeat superior theory of liability.  
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Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988).  
Rather, a plaintiff must aver facts to show the defendants’ 
personal involvement in the alleged misconduct.  Id.  Personal 
involvement requires particular “allegations of personal 
direction or of actual knowledge and acquiescence.”  Id.   
 
Here, the Complaint does not specifically allege 
personal involvement by any of the defendants.  The only 
evidence to which Dooley points to show Wetzel knew of 
Dooley’s mental health needs is the fact that he sent Wetzel a 
copy of documents reflecting his GBMI verdict and request for 
D Code designation and Wetzel’s lack of any response or 
action.  But this evidence does not demonstrate the personal 
direction or actual knowledge required under Rode, and 
Dooley’s allegations of Wetzel’s involvement are insufficient.  
See Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207–08.  Similarly, as to Kauffman and 
Goss, the only involvement alleged in the Complaint is their 
review and denial of Dooley’s grievance.  We therefore agree 
that Dooley failed to state a claim and conclude that the District 
Court did not err in dismissing the Complaint on that ground. 
  
The District Court erred, however, when it dismissed 
the Complaint as frivolous and without leave to amend.  It is 
well understood that “a complaint filed in forma pauperis is 
not automatically frivolous . . . because it fails to state a claim.”  
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 331 (1989); see also 
Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 112 (3d Cir. 
2002).  Rather, a claim is frivolous only where it depends “on 
an ‘indisputably meritless legal theory’ or a ‘clearly baseless’ 
or ‘fantastic or delusional’ factual scenario.”  Mitchell, 318 
F.3d at 530 (quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327–28).  Here, 
Dooley advanced a valid legal theory, and particularly given 
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our liberal pro se pleading standards, the factual scenario 
alleged was not clearly baseless or delusional. 
 
Dooley’s Complaint, construed liberally, laid out a 
plausibly valid theory for a § 1983 Eighth Amendment claim.  
Prison officials violate an inmate’s Eighth Amendment rights 
when they are deliberately indifferent to an inmate’s serious 
medical need.  See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976).  
A serious medical need exists where “failure to treat can be 
expected to lead to substantial and unnecessary suffering,” and 
a doctor has diagnosed the condition, or the need for treatment 
would be obvious to a lay person.  Colburn v. Upper Darby 
Twp., 946 F.2d 1017, 1023 (3d Cir. 1991).  Officials are 
deliberately indifferent to such needs when they are actually 
aware of a substantial risk of serious harm and disregard that 
risk.  See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994).  
Dooley’s Complaint turned on this Eighth Amendment legal 
theory, and the facts supporting it were not baseless, fantastic, 
or delusional.  See Mitchell, 318 F.3d at 530. 
 
The factual scenario in Dooley’s Complaint alleged a 
medical need in the form of serious mental health problems.  
Dooley’s claimed depression, pain, trauma, lack of sleep, 
nightmares, paranoia, and related mental health issues could 
constitute the requisite serious medical need if diagnosed or if 
the need for greater treatment would be obvious to a lay person.  
See Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854 F.3d 209, 222, 227 (3d Cir. 2017); 
Inmates of the Allegheny Cty. Jail v. Pierce, 612 F.2d 754, 763 
(3d Cir. 1979).  The jury’s GBMI finding and the sentencing 
judge’s comment about his mental health needs may show that, 
at one point, Dooley’s mental health problems were obvious to 
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lay people.4  Additional facts in an amended complaint might 
provide greater specificity necessary to demonstrate a serious 
medical need.  Thus, the currently alleged facts are not so 
clearly baseless as to make the claim frivolous.  
 
Similarly, if the prison officials were actually aware or 
knew of a substantial risk of serious harm when they allegedly 
failed to provide Dooley with D Code resources, and they 
disregarded that risk, then that could constitute deliberate 
indifference to a serious medical need.  See Farmer, 511 U.S. 
at 837.  Dooley did allege inaction on the part of the DOC 
Officials in the face of his repeated complaints about 
inadequate mental health treatment.  He alleged that the 
officials simply told him that he was not GBMI and therefore 
not a D Stability Code inmate.  We do not know whether the 
 
4 In arguing that Dooley cannot state an Eighth Amendment 
claim, Appellees as well as the Magistrate Judge have 
emphasized that the jury’s GBMI finding is not a medical 
diagnosis and does not operate as a legal requirement of 
specific mental health treatment.  This misunderstands the 
relevance of the GBMI verdict.  The fact that the GBMI finding 
may not alone establish a serious medical need or give rise to 
an obligation to provide specific treatment does not preclude 
its relevance as a fact that demonstrates the obviousness and 
seriousness of Dooley’s specifically pled psychiatric problems.  
In addition to demonstrating that a jury recognized Dooley’s 
mental illness, the GBMI verdict shows that Dooley, even if 
not found severely mentally disabled, had mental health needs 
that were serious enough to require—under current DOC 
policy—at least temporary D Code status and regular 
psychiatric evaluation. See Pa. DOC Reg. 
§ 13.8.1(2)(J)(1)(b)(2), (3). 
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officials ever considered whether Dooley was receiving 
appropriate mental health care or provided further evaluation 
to determine what level of treatment Dooley required.5  
Officials became aware of his contention that he required D 
Stability Code treatment at least by the time Dooley availed 
himself of the grievance process.  Goss further acknowledged 
involvement and knowledge of the situation beyond his role in 
the grievance process, and Dooley’s objections to the R&R 
raised new facts about the officials’ awareness of his situation 
and failure to intervene.  Although the Complaint, as pled, is 
lacking specific facts regarding the officials’ actions or 
inaction to show deliberate indifference, additional detail could 
satisfy that standard.  The factual scenario described by 
Dooley, particularly if he were permitted to amend his 
Complaint, could support a legally valid theory for an Eighth 
Amendment claim.  The District Court therefore should not 
have dismissed the Complaint as frivolous and instead should 
have permitted Dooley to amend. 
Moreover, the Court made no finding that amendment 
would be inequitable or futile.  We have held that district courts 
should dismiss complaints under the PLRA with leave to 
amend “unless amendment would be inequitable or futile.”  
Grayson, 293 F.3d at 108, 110; see also Shane v. Fauver, 213 
 
5 The DOC Officials repeatedly emphasize that “the jury’s 
nearly 20-year-old GBMI verdict” cannot be equated “with a 
current diagnosis by a doctor.”  Appellees’ Br. at 24.  But the 
same would be true of a sentencing judge’s nearly 20-year-old 
determination that a defendant was not “severely mentally 
disabled” so as to need continuing treatment.  Whether or not 
Dooley needed D Stability Code treatment in 2002 does not 
determine the appropriateness of such treatment now.  
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F.3d 113, 116 (3d Cir. 2000).6  That determination generally 
lies within the discretion of the District Court, and we thus 
review a district court’s decision not to grant leave to amend 
for abuse of discretion.  Travelers Indem. Co. v. Dammann & 
Co., Inc., 594 F.3d 238, 243 (3d Cir. 2010); Grayson, 293 F.3d 
at 108.  We have held, however, that “outright refusal to grant 
the leave without any justifying reason [i.e., inequity or futility] 
. . . is not an exercise of discretion; it is merely abuse of that 
discretion.”  Grayson, 293 F.3d at 108 (emphasis added) 
(alteration in original).  Here, the District Court engaged in no 
discussion about whether amendment would be inequitable or 
futile before adopting the R&R’s recommendation to dismiss 
without leave to amend.7  We conclude that amendment would 
not be clearly futile, and the District Court should have 
 
6 Appellees argue that the District Court implicitly found 
amendment futile when it determined the claim to be frivolous.  
We have noted that “dismissals of frivolous claims do not 
require leave to amend due to the long tradition of denying 
leave to amend . . . when amendment is inequitable or futile.”  
Grayson, 293 F.3d at 112–13.  But where, as here, the 
Complaint was properly dismissed, not as frivolous, but for 
failure to state a claim, plaintiffs “are entitled to amend their 
complaint unless doing so would be inequitable or futile.”  Id. 
at 111.   
7 The R&R determined that leave to amend was not appropriate 
because it found the Complaint “legally frivolous” and because 
the GBMI finding serves as a “legally operative factual 
finding, not a medical diagnosis.”  App. at 35–36.  As noted 
above, we conclude that Dooley’s Complaint is not legally 
frivolous.  
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permitted Dooley to amend the Complaint.  We will therefore 
vacate its order and remand for further proceedings.8  
 
b. Determination that the Dismissal Constitutes a 
PLRA “Strike”  
 
Dooley next objects to the District Court’s 
determination that the dismissal of his Complaint amounted to 
a “strike” under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 
specifically 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).  We exercise “plenary review 
with respect to the proper interpretation of the PLRA and its 
three strikes rule.”  Millhouse v. Heath, 866 F.3d 152, 156 (3d 
Cir. 2017).  Dooley contends that the District Court lacked the 
authority to prospectively label the dismissal a strike under the 
PLRA.  We agree.   
 
In examining whether the PLRA allows District Courts 
to prospectively—at the time of dismissal—label a dismissal a 
“strike” for purposes of future litigation, we turn first to the 
language of the statute.  28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) reads:  
 
In no event shall a prisoner 
bring a civil action or appeal a 
judgment in a civil action or 
proceeding under this section if 
the prisoner has, on 3 or more 
prior occasions, while 
 
8 We have not considered Appellees’ exhaustion arguments, 
which they raised again on appeal, because the District Court 
did not reach them.  Nothing in our decision today, however, 
prevents the District Court from revisiting the exhaustion issue 
on remand.  
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incarcerated or detained in any 
facility, brought an action or 
appeal in a court of the United 
States that was dismissed on the 
grounds that it is frivolous, 
malicious, or fails to state a claim 
upon which relief may be 
granted, unless the prisoner is 
under imminent danger of serious 
physical injury. 
(emphasis added).  This language contemplates a prisoner who 
attempts to bring a suit after having had three prior suits 
dismissed.  It thus envisions a determination at the time of the 
subsequent suit, in which a future district court evaluates 
whether “prior” suits “brought” by the same plaintiff were 
dismissed on enumerated grounds.  Id.   
 
 To interpret the statute otherwise would run afoul of 
Article III’s case or controversy requirement.  Under Article 
III, a “claim is not ripe for adjudication if it rests upon 
‘contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or 
indeed may not occur at all.’”  Texas v. United States, 523 U.S. 
296, 300 (1998) (quoting Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. 
Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 580–81 (1985)).  At the time of the 
dismissal of Dooley’s action, the question of whether that 
dismissal constituted a strike under § 1915(g) was premature.  
It had no immediate consequence because Dooley may never 
again seek to file a lawsuit.  The question is not ripe for 
adjudication unless or until he seeks to file a fourth suit in 
forma pauperis.  Deleon v. Doe, 361 F.3d 93, 95 (2d Cir. 2004); 
Lucien v. Jockisch, 133 F.3d 464, 469 n.8 (7th Cir. 1998).   
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 Leaving the § 1915(g) strike determination to a future 
court where the issue is squarely presented further avoids the 
risk that dismissing courts will make haphazard or erroneous 
determinations to which subsequent courts might defer.  
Deleon, 361 F.3d at 95 n.1.  Appellees contend that strike 
determinations are straightforward, requiring no briefing and 
carrying little to no risk of harm from erroneous decisions.  
That not only misses the point but is in itself questionable.  A 
strike carries great significance, and the gratuitous calling of a 
strike as happened here can clearly be damaging later on.  Only 
when the strike question has an immediate impact should a 
court rule on the issue, with the benefit of briefing by the 
parties if necessary.  The possibility for error regarding this 
important issue is greatly reduced before a future court 
considering the strike question at a moment when it carries 
immediate significance.9  This practical reality reinforces the 
natural reading of the statute, requiring that later courts make 
the strike determination only when the issue has become ripe 
 
9 Here, the District Court did, in fact, err in determining that 
the dismissal amounted to a strike under the PLRA.  Dooley 
brought his suit in state court and the DOC Officials removed 
the suit to federal court, but the PLRA speaks only to suits 
brought in federal court.  The statute applies to prisoners who 
“on 3 or more prior occasions . . . brought an action or appeal 
in a court of the United States that was dismissed” on an 
enumerated ground.  28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (emphasis added).  
We have held that, under the PLRA, “a prisoner has ‘brought 
an action’ when he tenders or submits his complaint to the 
court.”  Brown v. Sage, 941 F.3d 655, 661 (3d Cir. 2019).  
Dooley submitted his Complaint to the state court, not to “a 
court of the United States,” so it did not fall within the scope 
of § 1915(g).   
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for adjudication.  We therefore hold that the District Court 
lacked the authority, at the time of dismissal, to declare that the 
dismissal constituted a “strike” for purposes of § 1915(g). 
 
III. Conclusion  
Although we agree with the District Court that Dooley’s 
Complaint failed to state a claim, we find that the District Court 
erred in failing to grant leave to amend without determining 
whether such leave would be inequitable or futile.  The Court 
further erred when it prospectively and erroneously declared 
the dismissal to constitute a strike under § 1915(g).  For the 
foregoing reasons, we will vacate the District Court’s Order 
dismissing the Complaint without leave to amend and denying 
the Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment, and remand 
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  
